Disclaimers
The findings contained in this report are not to be construed as an official For unclassified documents, destroy by any method which -recludes reconstruction of the document.
The lack of time to prepare food and the lack of time to eat it were the two factors rated most highly as determinants of how much is eaten during combat. Among desirable properties of operational rations, ease of carrying and preparing foods were mentioned most frequently. 
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INTRODUCTION
In developing combat rations, it is important to consider the experience of those who have used operational rations under combat conditions. However, no previous survey concerned with combat feeding has been designed to sample the opinions of this particular population. A survey of U.S. Marines with combat experience was therefore conducted to study eating in combat. * Questionnaires were mailed to 1000 U.S. Marines who had served in combat; the final sample consisted of responses from 475 individuals.
The survey included questions on whether Marines ate more or less than usual during combat and if so, for what reasons. Marines were also asked what 4 food they were provided and what they ate. The questions on what and how much was eaten made specific reference to the first three days of a Marine's first and second combat experience. In the final section of the questionnaire, respondents were asked to rate the importance of several factors in * determining how much they ate during combat; they were also given the opportunity to comment on how and what they thought troops should be fed in combat.
SAMPLE SELECTION AND RESPONSE RATE
A request was made to USMC headquarters to obtain a sample of Marines who had served in combat.
To obtain a broad sample, the names of 500 active duty and 500 retired Marines were drawn from USMC files by headquarters personnel. Within each of these groups, half were enlisted and half were officers. The records of enlisted personnel were coded to indicate combat experience; for officers, however, no such code existed, so combat experience was inferred by corps.
Individually signed letters with personalized salutation (see Appendix A) were sent to the 1000 individuals identified by the USMC.
An "Eating in Combat" questionnaire was enclosed (see Appendix B), along with a franked and addressed return envelope.
A total of 475 completed questionnaires were returned in sufficient time to be coded, keypunched, and analyzed. Twelve completed questionnaires were returned after analysis had begun; 12 questionnaires were returned incomplete with an explanation that the respondent lacked or had only limited combat experience. Twenty-four letters * were returned undelivered. The number of nonrespondents was 477. The response rate based on the number of delivered surveys was 51%, which compares favorably with the response rates typically obtained in mail surveys. 1 
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE
The present age of the 475 respondents ranged from 27 to 77; the mean age was 45.6 (standard deviation -10.3). The average number of years in duty was 20.3 (standard deviation -5.4).
Nearly 52%. of the respondents were currently * on active duty, indicating about equal representation in the sample of retired * and active duty personnel. Geographical distribution was assessed by asking * respondents what state they lived in longest before entering the Marine Corps.
In the sample, 59% had lived the longest in the state of New York, and another 257. were distributed among Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Virginia and New Jersey. The geographical emphasis in the sample on eastern and northeas,.ern states is the result of the procedure used by USMC headquarters to sample its files. Table 1 describes selected demographic characteristics of the sample at the time of the first and second combat situations. The average age at the time of combat was 24.6 (first combat experience) and 27.7 (second combat experience). The percentage of officers in the sample was 53% and 65%, respectively. 
RESULTS
* Amount Eaten During Combat
Respondents were asked how much they ate on the first three days of their first and second combat situations. The response alternatives were "more than usual," "about the same as usual," "about 3/4 of what I usually ate," "'about 1/2 of what I usually ate," "about 1/4 of what I usually ate," and "n~othing". The response frequencies, in percent, are shown in Table 2 . The bottom row (N) indicates the number of individuals who responded to the quettion. Ihi'-number varies across columns, since not every individual experienced two combat situations or combat situations extending over three days. Table 3 shows that a substantial percentage of the sample reported eating less than usual. The percentage ranges from 68%, on the first day of the first combat situation, to 45% on the third day of the second combat situation.
The relative amount of food respondents reported eating during combat was computed by the following method: eating the usual amount was coded 1, eating less than usual was coded by the indicated amount (0 to 3/4 of the usual amount), and eating more than usual was coded 1.25. This coding results in equal one-quarter spacing among all response alternatives, which is clearly justified except at the top of the scale. Considering the small percentage * of respondents who reported eating more than usual (see Table 2 ), the 
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consequence of any distortion is likely to be minimal. Table 4 shows the average relative amounts eaten each day. On the first day of the first combat situation, the amount eaten was about half the usual amount. The amount increased to about three-fourths by the third day of the second combat situation.
An analysis of variance with repeated measures was performed in order to test for a significant linear and quadratic trend in the amount eaten. The two combat situations were analyzed separately, because the time between them * varied among respondents, and only those respondents were included who experienced three days of combat. 
05).
These results show that the amount eaten increased significantly across the first three days of a combat situation. However, the increase from the second to the third day was significantly smaller than the increase from the first to the second day. The amount eaten appears to reach a maximum at approximately three-quarters of the usual amount.
Tables 3 and 4 also suggest that eating is especially inhibited on the very first day in combat. The onset of the second combat experience does not seem to affect eating to the same degree.
Reasons for Eating More or Less
Respondents who reported eating more or less than usual during combat were asked to explain why.
The stated reasons were classified as falling in one of 14 response categories, which were derived from a review of the range of answers provided.
Appendix C lists the 14 response categories along with examples of answers falling in each category. In the statistical summary, one response category, "too thirsty," was dropped, because it was mentioned less than 1% of the time as a reason for eating less on any one day. Several response categories were combined on account of their semantic similarity. Thus, the categories "nervous or tense" and "seared" were treated as one category ("fear"); reasons relating to an individual's ill-being (feeling "sick" or "tired") were combined, as were the responses relating to the inconvenience of carrying or preparing food and its interference with carrying equipment or ammunition.
only a small percentage of respondents (see Table 2 ) ever stated eating more than usual during combat. Two reasons were reported for doing so: fear and previous or anticipated food deprivation. The first may be an example of stress-induced overeating. 2 In the second case, respondents were either very L7 hungry or were stocking up, because they anticipated not eating for some time.
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wVL Table 5 provides a breakdown of the reasons for eating less than usual on each day of the first and second combat situations. The reasons are listed in the order of the average percent of mention across the six days of the two combat situations (see the last column of Table 5 ). Note that the percentages in any one column sum to more than 100%, since respondents were free to state more than one reason for eating less. Table 5 shows that the most frequently mentioned reason for eating less was "engaged in combat," indicating that there was insufficient opportunity during combat to eat. Examples of responses in this category are "too busy for chow," "under constant attack" and "on patrol all day and night so there was lack of opportunity to eat." "Fear" was mentioned as a reason 32% of the time on the first day of the first combat situation. Sample responses are "tense," "anxiety," "more than a little scared," and "bundles of nerves." The percentage of "fear" responses declined markedly over the subsequent two days of the first combat situation and over the three days of the second situation. "Not hungry" was mentioned between 14% and 17% of the time. Next in frequency of mention were "supplies not available" ("shortage of rations," "only issued one meal"), "weather" ("temperature was higher than I was used to," "oppressive heat made appetite subside") and "tired, sick" ("diarrhea," "too exhausted to prepare food"). Respondents also mentioned that they ate less because of the quality of food ("bad," "tasteless," "contaminated"), and the inconvenience of preparing or carrying rations ("food too heavy to carry," "could not carry much food because it interfered with carrying ammunition").
In order to investigate the time trends in the reasons for eating less, an analysis of variance with repeated measures was performed, based on those individuals for whom data on three days of a combat situation were available. The two combat situations were analyzed separately. The dependent variable was the mention or nonmention of a particular reason. The following response categories were examined: "engaged in combat," "fear," and "not hungry." There was a statistically significant linear decrease during the three days of the first combat situation in the frequency of mention of "fear" (F(1, 114) -18.02, p < 0.001). The decrease during the second combat situation was not statistically significant. The only other statistically significant trend among those examined was the linear decrease during the second combat situation in the frequency of mention of "engaged in combat" (E(1, 66) -4.75, P 0.05). Thus, during the first combat situation, the importance of "fear" as a reason for eating less declined significantly across the three days. A smaller, but nonetheless significant, decline was observed in the importance of combat activity as a reason for eating less during the second combat situation.
The decrease in the percentage of the respondents mentioning "fear" as a reason for eating less parallels the decrease in the overall proportion of respondents that reported eating less than usual. This parallelism is shown in Figures 1 and 2 , for the first and second combat situations, respectively. The similar rates of decline suggest that the decrease in the percentage eating less than usual may be due mainly to a reduction in the level of fear among the combatants. On the basis of the present data, this hypothesis can 
Day1
Day2 Day3
First Combat Situation Respondents either named a particular ration or specified particular foods (or both). The percentages in Tables 6  and 7 are calculated on the basis of the number of respondents who answered the question in one way or the other. Since the percentages were similar across the days of the first and second combat situation, the tables show the average percentages across all six days. Table 6 shows that, on the average, 77% of the respondents were provided C rations* to eat. A direct comparison between what was eaten and what was provided is not possible on the basis of these data because respondents tended to give only the name of the ration in answering the question about what was provided, but tended to list specific foods in answering the question about what was eaten.
Ratings Of What Determines How Much Is Eaten In Combat
Respondents were asked to rate the importance of several factors in determining how much they ate during combat. A seven-point scale was provided, with scale steps ranging from 1 -very unimportant to 7 -very important. The mean ratings are shown in Table 8 , along with the percentage of respondents rating a factor 1951 (somewhat important) or higher. An asterisk identifies the mean ratings that are significantly greater than "4" (neutral), as determined by t-tests. Table 8 shows that the two most highly rated factors in determining how much was eaten during combat were the lack of time to prepare food and the lack of time to eat it.
This result agrees with the answers to the open-ended question, in which "engaged in combat" was mentioned most often as the reason for eating less than usual. Both findings demonstrate the importance of time in determining how much is eaten in combat. Other factors of importance are a lack of appetite, the condition of the weather, and the quality of the food. These factors were also mentioned as reasons for eating less in the earlier part of the questionnaire.
*The term "C-rations," as used by these respondents, refers both to the ration in use during the post World War II and Korean periods (Ration, Individual, Combat), as well as to the ration that replaced it, the Meal Combat Individual (MCI). 
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Commnents On Feeding In Combat
The final section of the questionnaire provided respondents with the opportunity to comment on how and what troops should be fed in combat.
Respondents commented on general aspects of operational rations as well as on particular rations. The response categories used to classify the general comments and examples of comments are contained in Appendix D. Table 9 shows that 50% of the respondents mentioned that rations should be easy to prepare. Examples of comments in this category are "quick to fix," "foods that need no preparation -can be eaten when time permits' and 'packages that open easily.'' Thirty-four percent mentioned the need for rations to be easy to carry. Some . 7 of the comments were "combat rations should be compact so they take up little space,"~ "do away with cans so man is able to carry more food with him" "we need items that can be easily stored in pockets and are not bulky."
The importance of convenience in operational rations has emerged repeatedly in the present'study. Other comments on the ease of preparing and carrying rations concerned the need to simplify the packaging, to reduce the number of components and make the refuse easy to dispose.
Frequently, respondents mentioned that combat rations should be consumable hot or cold. Several comments concerning the problems of heating food with equipment involving open flames, which had to be avoided because of risk of detection by the enemy. Heat tabs were frequently in short supply or did not heat food properly. Several noted that with heavy rations any excess food was discarded, and only the minimal amount was carried. Others expressed their 2 desire for ration components they thought best suited for eating on the run, such as "quick energy" granola bars, beef jerky and the like, which can be eaten in stages over a period of time when the situation allows, especially on the first day of combat. Freeze dried and compressed components were praised for their convenience and taste (see below), but frequently the lack of sufficient water for rehydration was seen as detracting from the usefulness of these ration components.
One Marine, for example, wrote "I'm concerned that freeze dried or dehydrated foods (are) not a proper substitute for canned foods--there are many days that I found the availability of water lacking--without canned fruit my company, on one occasion, would have been in terrible * shape." Others mentioned the need for rations to be tailored to the climate in which combat is fought and to the type of combat (slow or fast moving, front line vs. rear support, etc.). Table 9 shows further that the desire for tasty food was mentioned by 25%, and the need for hot meals by 22% of the respondents. Frequently, Marines mentioned wanting at least one hot meal per day (preferably messtype), and commented on the importance of a hot meal for morale.
However, in hot climate, some respondents felt there was less of a need for hot, than for * palatable, cold rations. Several respondents suggested that the inclusion of additional spices, such as hot sauce, soy sauce, mustard, and pepper, would help to overcome the blandness of the rations.
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VARIETY IN MEALS 12
Other desirable aspects of operational rations mentioned (see Table 9 ) were high caloric content (frequency of mention -16%), high level of nutrients (13%) and variety in meals (12%).
Some of the comments on variety were made by respondents who reported eating C-rations for many weeks. Under those conditions, some Marines reported reducing food intake and losing weight.
Relatively few positive or negative comments were made about particular rations. The Long Range Patrol (LRP) ration was mentioned positively by 10% of the respondents (N -412), C-rations received 6% positive and 5% negative comments. The LRP was considered convenient and light weight, but several commented negatively on the problem of securing adequate water for rehydration. C-rations were criticized for being heavy, containing too much fat, leading to constipation, and being monotonous (over many weeks of use). However, others mentioned C-rations as being "adequate" combat rations. Among specific foods, no foods were mentioned that were desired in lesser amounts. Fruit was mentioned most frequently (by 13% of respondents) as the food that was desired in greater amounts. The preference for fruit has been noted in other surveys of ration acceptability. 3 The most stringent test of the acceptability of a combat ration is obtained under conditions of actual combat. However, in developing and evaluating operational rations it is usually necessary to rely on known preferences of individuals in the population and on experience gained in field exercises. The present survey is unique in that it is addressed to the final customer of the operational ration --the individual engaged in combat. The goal of this survey was not to assess the adequacy of any one particular ration system or concept, but to address general questions of how much troops eat during combat and what factors determine how much they eat. The present results suggest that during the first day of combat, troops eat considerably less than their normal amount. While troops tend to eat more on successive days, the trend in how much they eat indicates a leveling off in -~ the amount at a point corresponding to three-quarters of the usual amount.
The reduced level of consumption is not the result of an inadequate food supply. Lack of supplies was mentioned as a reason for eating less only by * 10% (on the average) of the respondents. The principal reason for reduced consumption is the lack of time to prepare and to eat food. Respondents mentioned "engaged in combat" most frequently as a reason for eating less and "not enough time to prepare food" and "not enough time to eat food" were rated the most important reasons in determining how much was eaten. Finally, in commenting on how and what troops should be fed in combat, the most frequent comment, made by 50% of the sample, was that rations should be easy to prepare; 34% mentioned the need for rations to be easy to carry. Clearly, the ease of preparing, eating, and carrying food is the most critical factor for this sample in determining how much is eaten during combat.
The present sample consisted entirely of U.S. Marines, and the type of combat encountered by Marines may differ from that experienced by other sections of the Armed Forces. In particular, Marine units are highly mobile and often encounter unconventional combat situations. The survey results may reflect the emphasis that these troops place on mobility and on the ability to "leat on the run." In designing an optimal ration system for such troops, convenience needs to receive special attention. An operational ration that is easy to prepare and carry will maximize the probability that the soldier will find the time to consume the meal and will therefore help ensure that he receives adequate nourishment.
This document reports research undertaken at the US Army Natick Research and Development Command and has been assigned No.
X.
NATCK/TR-_LVPaLo in the series of reports approved for publication. In order to develop operational rations, it is important that we hear from people like yourself who have actually served in combat. We are particularly interested in your opinions, as the type of combat operation typically conducted by Marines in the past is most like what is envisioned for future operations. We would appreciate it if you would take a few moments to complete the inclosed questionnaire.
We realize that it may be difficult to remember events that occurred a number of years ago, but try to be as accurate as possible when filling out the inclosed questionnaire. If you simply cannot recall the answer to a question, please write, "cannot recall" by that question.
To assure your privacy, we request that you not use your name. No information given will be associated with you personally. Please take this questionnaire seriously; your answers will be taken seriously.
When you have completed the inclosed questionnaire, please return it in the envelope provided. No postage is necessary. Again, thank you for your help. (10) FOOD WAS NOT IMPORTANT. Respondents reported that food was a low priority. Examples: "I was more concerned with the situation than with the food," "food was the farthest thing from my mind," "occupied 2 with other concerns."( 11) INCONVENIENCE OF FOOD. Respondents reported that it was not convenient to prepare or carry rations. Examples: "food was too heavy to carry," "carried the lightest food that I could-cookies, coffee, crackers and jam," "carried less than full rations to save weight," "not able to d prepare food when on the move," "took too long to heat food with heat tabs."
(12) INTERFERED WITH COMBAT EQUIPMENT. Respondents reported that carrying food interfered with carrying combat equipment. Examples: "could not carry much food because it interfered with carrying ammunition," "~we eliminated the junk food portions of C's to allow us to carry more ammo~t (13) PREVIOUS DEPRIVATION OR ANTICIPATED FUTURE DEPRIVATION. Respondents reported that they recently had nothing or little to eat or that they anticipated, because of future combat, having nothing or little to eat. Examples: "nothing to eat the first day," "I did not know when I would have a chance to eat so I stocked up," "a tendency to bulk up for the future." (14) TOO THIRSTY. Respondents reported being very thirsty. Examples: ''too thirsty."
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